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Supporters of free market economics have always 
been ambivalent towards nationalism. In an 
important book called ‘Nation, State and Economy’ 
(1919), the leading Austrian neoclassical thinker 
Ludwig von Mises argued that it was natural for 
human groups, who shared a common language, 
to adopt national identities, although these 
need not be coterminous with state boundaries, 
as the example of the Germans showed.1 Given 
the practical difﬁculties of establishing a world 
state to oversee the capitalist system, nation-
states were as good a basis for establishing the 
necessary legal framework for economic activity 
as any other; but when nationalism was used to 
mobilise popular support for state activities which 
impeded the competitive operation of the world 
market, then it became a danger to economic 
rationality, as understood by representatives of 
the Austrian school. Nationalism as the mobilising 
principle with which to establish a free economy 
was acceptable to them; nationalism as collective 
interference in the free economy was not.
Neoliberalism follows neoclassical economics 
in relation to nationalism, as in so much else. 
Neoliberals tend not to describe themselves in 
these terms, but as supporters of globalisation, 
which they assume has to be capitalist in 
character. Turn to any of the contemporary works 
which extol the beneﬁts of this process and 
we ﬁnd nationalism indicted for an extensive 
litany of crimes, including making militarist 
threats to peace, erecting protectionist barriers 
to free trade and expressing racist hostility to 
migrants. The movements for an alternative 
globalisation which emerged in Seattle during 
1999 are routinely accused of wanting to prevent 
third world development for selﬁsh nationalist 
reasons.2 Yet if we look beyond the rhetoric of 
neoliberal publicists to the behaviour of neoliberal 
politicians and state managers we ﬁnd a different 
attitude towards nationalism. As David Harvey has 
noted, “the neoliberal state needs nationalism of 
a certain sort to survive”.3 To understand why, we 
need to be clear about what neoliberalism is.
The Consequences of Neoliberalism
By ‘neoliberalism’ I mean those interlocking 
economic and social policies that have become 
the collective orthodoxy since the mid-1970s. 
Although the following list is by no means 
exhaustive, any attempt to catalogue them would 
include: ﬂexible labour markets, deregulation of 
ﬁnancial markets, removal of protective tariffs and 
subsidies on essential goods, privatisation of state-
owned industries and utilities, commodiﬁcation 
of services once provided free at the point of 
use, and the shift from direct and progressive to 
indirect and regressive taxation. These have been 
adopted by states, including the remaining few 
that claim to have superseded capitalism, of which 
China is incomparably the most important, and 
by transnational institutions like the World Bank 
and the World Trade Organisation, which police 
international development and (in)stability in the 
interests of the global order. The emergence of 
neoliberalism as a conscious ruling class strategy, 
rather than an esoteric ideological doctrine, took 
place in response to the end of the post-war boom 
in the 1970s, but in changed conditions created by 
that boom: above all, the unprecedented expansion 
of international trade, the advent of cross-border 
production in order to utilise world forces of 
production rather than those of one territorial 
state, and the creation of ‘offshore’ banking and 
ﬂows of money capital unlimited by national 
boundaries. More than any other development, 
this last one made government policies vulnerable 
to attack when they were seen to be acting 
against the interest of capital. Unlike factories, 
money can be moved and is not dependent on 
protection of a territorial state or states. States 
had not become completely powerless in the 
face of markets, of course – that is the myth of 
globalisation cultivated by politicians seeking to 
shift responsibility for neoliberal policies onto 
supposedly ‘great impersonal forces’ over which 
they had no control. Neoliberalism represented a 
choice, but it was a choice increasingly difﬁcult to 
avoid so long as the goal was the continuation and 
expansion of capitalism at all costs4.
Neoliberalism has not succeeded in reducing 
either poverty or inequality; but far more 
fundamentally, from the perspective of the 
international capitalist class, it has failed in 
terms of the system itself. It has not recreated 
the conditions for capital accumulation which 
existed during the Great Boom. Above all, it has 
failed consistently to increase the rate of proﬁt. 
To the extent it has intermittently done so, it has 
not achieved rates comparable to those between 
1948 and 1974.5 Accumulation has come to rely on 
increasing productivity on the one hand (making 
fewer people work harder) and decreasing the 
share of income going to labour on the other 
(paying workers less in real terms), but that is not 
physically sustainable indeﬁnitely. Furthermore, 
the suppression of real wage levels, notably in the 
UK and USA, has encouraged the very dependence 
on borrowing which has now entered crisis. Far 
from this being a means of ‘consumers’ to add to 
their possessions – as moralistic accounts imply 
– it has been driven by their need to maintain 
personal liquidity through loans, mortgages, credit, 
overdrafts and the rest, precisely to meet the costs 
of the ultra-commodiﬁed world neoliberalism has 
created. But an economy which requires systemic 
debt to maintain expansion is scarcely in a healthy 
condition. The real success of neoliberalism has 
been to transfer wealth and resources to the 
ruling class and its hangers-on. There are, however, 
limits to this process. The opportunity provided by 
opening up the hitherto closed Stalinist economies 
was a once-and-for-all operation. Similarly, there is 
a limit to how far wealth can simply be transferred 
from the public to the private sector; for ultimately 
this is simply relocating existing money and 
resources within the system. But capitalism can 
only survive through expanding production, not 
mere personal enrichment.
The Necessity for Nationalism in the 
Neoliberal Order 
Nationalism is the necessary ideological corollary 
of capitalism. The capitalist class in its constituent 
parts has a continuing need to retain territorial 
home bases for their operations.6 Why? Capitalism 
is based on competition, but capitalists want 
competition to take place on their terms; they do 
not want to suffer the consequences if they lose. 
In one sense then, they want a state to ensure 
that they are protected from these consequences 
– in other words, they require from a state more 
than simply providing an infrastructure; they 
need it to ensure that effects of competition are 
experienced as far as possible by someone else. 
A global state could not do this; indeed, in this 
respect it would be the same as having no state 
at all. For if everyone is protected then no-one is: 
unrestricted market relations would prevail, with 
all the risks that entails. The state therefore has to 
have limits, has to be able to distinguish between 
those who will receive its protection and those 
who will not. But the state cannot simply be the 
site of particular functions, with no ideological 
attachment; capitalists have at least to try to 
convince themselves that what they are doing is 
in a greater ‘national’ interest, even if it is plainly 
in their own. Without some level of self-delusion, 
mere gangsterism will result. Therefore, when 
Liah Greenﬁeld describes the ‘spirit of capitalism’ 
as “the economic expression of the collective 
competitiveness inherent in nationalism – itself 
a product of its members’ collective investment 
in the dignity and prestige of the nation”, she is 
turning history on its head.7 It is the collective 
competitiveness of capitalism, expressed at the 
level of the state which requires nationalism as 
a framework within which competitiveness can 
be justiﬁed in terms of a higher aspiration than 
increased proﬁt margins. If ‘Britain’ – or for that 
matter, ‘Scotland’ – is to be collectively competitive 
then this obviously means that individual British 
(or Scottish) companies must be individually 
competitive, but they are in competition with each 
other as much as with foreign rivals. In the course 
of this competition some will fail. Their failure, 
however is a contribution to national survival, 
comparable, perhaps, to the sacriﬁce of soldiers in 
the ﬁeld: competition is the health of the nation, 
just as war was once held to be the health of the 
state.
Nationalism does not simply unify territorially 
demarcated sections of the bourgeois culture; it 
plays an equally important function for capital 
in fragmenting the working class. Georg Lukacs 
once pointed out that one of the ways in which 
the bourgeoisie tries to prevent workers achieving 
coherent class consciousness is by “binding the 
individual members of those classes as single 
individuals, as mere ‘citizens’, to an abstract state 
reigning over and above them”.8 But it cannot be 
an ‘abstract state’; it has to be a very concrete, 
particular state founded on a sense of common 
identity. For the working class, nationalism arises 
from two sources. One is from the spontaneous 
search for a form of collective identity with which 
to overcome the alienation of capitalist society. 
National consciousness is therefore an alternative 
to class consciousness, but is rarely a complete 
alternative, since reformism is effectively the 
means by which nationalism is naturalised 
in the working class. But the other source is 
the deliberate fostering of nationalism by the 
bourgeoisie in order to bind workers to the state 
and through the state binds them to capital.9 
Hence the absurdity of claims by Tom Nairn that 
“what the extra-American world should fear is not 
US nationalism but the debility of the American 
state”, as if the nationalism was not the means 
by which the American state mobilises popular 
support behind imperialist adventures like those 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.10
The application of neoliberal policies over the 
past thirty years has increased the alienation 
and atomisation which is the normal condition 
of everyday life under capitalism, but it has also 
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done more. “Capitalism needs a human being 
who has never existed”, writes Terry Eagleton, 
“one who is prudently restrained in the ofﬁce 
and wildly anarchic in the shopping mall.”11 But 
precisely because these human beings do not exist, 
because the economic and the social are not as 
separate in life as they are in academic disciplines, 
the anarchy, the emphasis on self-gratiﬁcation, 
self-realisation, and self-fulﬁlment through 
commodities has tended to permeate all relations, 
with uncertain consequences. In the face of the 
resulting ‘social anarchy and nihilism’, Harvey 
notes, with perhaps excessive restraint, “some 
degree of coercion appears necessary to restore 
order”.12 Unchecked, the future will be as foreseen 
by George Steiner at the fall of the Berlin Wall: a 
combination of repression and commodiﬁcation, 
“The knout on the one hand; the cheeseburger 
on the other.”13 But repression on its own will not 
produce the degree of willing acceptance which 
the system requires. 
In these circumstances nationalism plays two 
roles: it provides a type of psychic compensation 
for the direct producers which is unobtainable 
from the mere consumption of commodities, and 
it acts as a means of recreating at the political 
level the cohesion which is being lost at the 
social. It is no accident that the nationalist 
turn in the ideology of the Chinese ruling class 
became most marked with the initial opening up 
to world markets in 1978 and the suppression of 
the movement for political reform in 1989, which 
was followed by a ‘patriotic education campaign’; 
the general tone of which continues to this day, 
as in different ways Taiwanese and Tibetans have 
discovered to their cost.14 Britain is in no position 
to criticise the Chinese in this respect: two of the 
most disgraceful statements to have been made 
by Gordon Brown – from an admittedly crowded 
ﬁeld – are that we should stop apologising for the 
British Empire and that British jobs should be the 
preserve of British workers.
Problems of Blowback
The division into national territories has always 
helped to allocate where the devaluation or 
destruction of capital occurs, as one set of state 
managers attempt to protect their ‘own’ capitals 
from the pressure of global crisis at the expense 
of other sets attempting the same. This occurs 
most sharply in cases of actual military conﬂict: 
“In an age of mass politics all interstate wars are 
nationalist wars, conducted in the name of nations 
and purportedly in their interests”.15 But war is 
scarcely the only, or even the most common form 
of geopolitical rivalry. Edward Luttwak describes 
the new rivalries as “geo-economics” or “warfare 
by other means”; “In it, investment capital for 
industry provided or guided by the state is the 
equivalent of ﬁrepower; product development 
subsidised by the state is the equivalent of weapon 
innovation; and market penetration supported by 
the state replaces military bases and garrisons on 
foreign soil as well as diplomatic inﬂuence.” These 
are not simply analogies. As Luttwak notes, war 
may be “different from commerce, but evidently 
not different enough”; “In particular, an action-
reaction cycle of trade restrictions that evoke 
retaliation has a distinct resemblance to crisis 
escalation that can lead to outright war”.16
But what Luttwak calls the “adversarial 
attitudes” mobilised by states can of course escape 
the control of those who initially fostered them. 
Ian Kershaw suggests that one of the reasons 
the Japanese military elite were forced into the 
Second World War was that it had encouraged 
levels of mass chauvinism and expectations of 
military-territorial expansion from which it could 
not retreat without provoking popular hostility: 
the generals were trapped in a prison of their own 
devising.17 Norman Stone argues more generally 
that the First World War could not have been 
brought to a negotiated end by the end of 1916 
no matter what the politicians and generals may 
have wished, because the nationalist hatreds they 
had encouraged, now ampliﬁed by the deaths, 
injuries and destruction, had acquired their own 
‘momentum’ and called forth leaders committed 
to victory.18 But similar outcomes can be found 
in the neoliberal era. Gowan has argued that 
Conservative hostility to the EU, now inherited 
by New Labour, is inexplicable at purely policy 
level, given the neoliberal programme upon 
which EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) is 
designed to institutionalise and to which all British 
parties are committed. But because the neoliberal 
reforms have so singularly failed to rejuvenate the 
British economy, other than by enriching a new 
rentier class, it would be exposed to competition 
which would reveal underlying weaknesses that 
neoliberalism was supposed to have corrected. 
Resurgent imperial nationalism was unleashed 
for the purposes of defending one version of the 
interests of national capital, but now prevents 
British politicians and state managers from 
pursuing any other strategy, however rational from 
their perspective.19
But there is another danger for ruling classes 
too, namely that neoliberal nationalism will lead 
to the fragmentation of neoliberal states. Harvey 
writes: “Margaret Thatcher, through the Falklands/
Malvinas war and in her antagonistic posture 
towards Europe, invoked nationalist sentiment in 
support of her neoliberal project, though it was 
the idea of England and St George, rather than the 
United Kingdom, that animated her vision – which 
turned Scotland and Wales hostile.”20 But would 
the hostility of (some) Scottish and (some) Welsh 
people have been less had Thatcher conveyed 
a sense of Britishness rather than Englishness? 
Gordon Brown is currently trying to do the 
former, with no real success. The difﬁculty here 
is a deeper one. Because nationalism is such an 
inescapable aspect of capitalist development, the 
ﬁrst response to intolerable conditions is to seek 
to establish a new nation-state, although this is 
usually only possible where some level of national 
consciousness already exists, as it does in Scotland. 
In other words, neoliberalism may require nations, 
but it does not require particular nations.
Alternatives to Nationalism?
In spite of the risks, however, it is not clear what 
could replace nationalism as a means of securing 
even the partial loyalty of the working class to 
the capitalist state and preventing the formation 
of class consciousness. (Football doesn’t quite 
do it although it sometimes appears to be one 
of the candiates). Early on in the neoliberal era, 
Raymond Williams noted that “a global system of 
production and trade” also required “a socially 
organised and socially disciplined population, 
one from which effort can be mobilised and taxes 
collected along the residual but still effective 
national lines; there are still no effective political 
competitors in that”.21 In many ways, nationalism 
took over the role of religion as ‘the heart of a 
heartless world’ and it is not clear how the latter 
could reclaim that role. The resurgence of religious 
belief is real, although not extensive enough to 
roll back all the achievements of secularisation, 
and it is almost everywhere subordinated to local 
nationalisms. And there is a further difﬁculty. One 
ideological aspect of the ‘War on Terror’ has been 
a revival of a pre-Marxist or vulgar Enlightenment 
critique of religion, focussed on the supposedly 
backward nature of Islam. For this critique to carry 
any credibility, however, it must be extended to 
all religions; hence the appearance of books with 
titles like ‘Against all Gods’, ‘The God Delusion’ 
and ‘God is not Great’. My point here is not the 
absurdity or moral bankruptcy of highly paid 
establishment intellectuals like Richard Dawkins 
and Christopher Hitchens posturing as heroic 
opponents of religious tyranny, but the fact that 
there is a division within bourgeois thought on the 
subject of religion which makes it unusable as the 
principle means of achieving ideological cohesion.
Could loyalties be transferred upwards to 
a global or even regional state? Montserrat 
Guibernau has argued that the European Union 
will ultimately require “European national 
consciousness” to give coherence to the otherwise 
uneven group of nations which comprise that 
body.22 But as Benedict Anderson writes, “in 
themselves, market-zones, ‘natural’-geographic or 
politico-administrative, do not create attachments. 
Who would willingly die for Comecon or the 
EEC?”23 Nor could loyalties easily be transferred 
downwards to individual capitals. It has been 
known for workers to support their company, even 
to make sacriﬁces to maintain it in business. But 
this tends to happen where these are local, well 
established and where workers are employed on a 
long-term basis. Where workers make sacriﬁces in 
terms of job losses, worsened conditions and – as 
happened in the USA during the 1980s – actual 
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cuts in pay. They do not do so because of loyalty to 
the ﬁrm, but because they see no alternative that 
does not involve the even worse fate of losing their 
job entirely. Individual managers or ‘team-leaders’ 
may internalise the ethos of McDonalds or Wal-
Mart, but workers cannot: the reality of the daily 
conﬂict between themselves and the employer is 
too stark to be overcome. Beyond this, even those 
companies which still retain health insurance 
and pension arrangements come nowhere near 
providing the integrative functions of even the 
weakest nation-state. It is of course possible 
for workers outside a company to celebrate its 
achievements – but only because it is national.24
Conclusion
Neoliberalism is a reorganisation of capitalism 
and, like all forms of capitalism, it needs both 
the territorial nation-state form and the ideology 
of nationalism. For Scots, perhaps closer to the 
establishment of a nation-state than at any time 
since 1707, the point is of extreme importance. 
There are many reasons, including Trident, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, why no-one should lift a 
ﬁnger to preserve the British imperial state; but 
that is a tactical consideration. If the argument 
of this article is correct, then forming a new 
nation-state will not in itself relieve the pressures 
that make that option an attractive one. In 
social terms, the minority SNP government is 
operating close to the limits of reformism, largely 
in order to build an electoral base at the expense 
of the Labour Party.25 The limits are set by its 
adherence to the neoliberal economic agenda 
and they will be reached very shortly. When that 
happens, regardless of whether Scotland is in or 
out of the UK, we would do well to remember 
that, ultimately, nationalism of any sort is – to 
paraphrase a slogan of 40 years ago – part of the 
problem, not part of the solution.
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